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A large segment of support for the Republican Party is made up of white, working class voters, a
group which would likely beneﬁt more from the redistributive measures advocated by the
Democratic Party. In new research, Kieran Bezila, with collaborators Monica Prasad and Steve
Hoﬀman, investigates this seeming contradiction, by looking at the economic dimension of moral
and cultural appeals. He argues that pragmatic economic concerns are important to working-class
voters, concerns which translate to a dislike of redistributive policies advocated by the Democratic
Party which they see as “spendthrift” and imprudent.
One of the puzzles of contemporary voting behavior is why working class voters do not reliably vote for parties of the
left that support redistributive measures that would directly beneﬁt them. For Fexample, as Figure 1 shows, one-
third to one-half of the American white working class votes Republican, and this is true whether one deﬁnes working
class by income, education, a combination of the two, or subjective self-identiﬁcation (the data from the latest
election are not yet available).  A common explanation, that moral or cultural values (such as attitudes on
immigration, abortion, race, etc.) trump economic concerns, has been the subject of much debate among scholars,
without a clear resolution. The vast majority of empirical work done on this question has drawn on survey data. 
Figure 1 – White working class support for Republicans
Note: Presidential elections, percent voting for Republican candidates, 1948-2012, using
diﬀerent deﬁnitions of “working class”. Source: National Election Studies, SDA Archive,
sda.berkeley.edu.  Income: less than 33 percent percentile (1948-2004), less than $35,000
(2008, 2012). Education: less than Bachelor’s.  Subjective self-identiﬁcation: working class.
In new research, we provide a new direction for this debate by changing methods and oﬀering a new argument.
Drawing on in-depth personal interviews with 120 white working class voters in “Pleasant Park”, a Midwestern
American town with a predominantly white (over 95 percent in the last Census) semi-skilled population, we argue
that moral and cultural appeals do matter to these voters, but these moral and cultural appeals have an economic
dimension: voters believe that these moral behaviors are the ones that will help them prosper economically. We
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argue that our respondents work to sustain a worldview and lifestyle that they see as in their general economic
interest, and that speciﬁc issues and behaviors become implicated in that worldview and lifestyle.  This worldview
and lifestyle are often articulated in the discourse of morality.  But this discourse is neither arbitrary, nor driven only
by the need to create social status distinctions between diﬀerent social group by identifying some people and
behaviors as moral or immoral. Instead, pragmatic economic concerns are woven throughout.
One intriguing example of the economic embeddedness of moral values concerned the meaning of the word
“conservative” for our respondents. When not being employed as a general political label, its most frequent
substantive use was, surprisingly, not in reference to abortion, immigration, gay rights, or any other hot-button
American conservative issue, but in regard to personal ﬁnances: for our respondents, being “conservative” in daily
life meant ﬁrst-and-foremost managing one’s own money properly, not being a spendthrift, and thus fulﬁlling the
moral obligation to take care of oneself without relying on others for help or aid, a sign of moral weakness.
We term this practice of adhering to certain moral behaviors in order to prosper economically “walking the line”, and
it’s something our respondents associated with the policies and philosophy of the Republican Party. By contrast,
Democrats were often seen as a spendthrift party that shamelessly bought votes with various ‘bribes’ (social welfare
programs, such as government subsidies to the indigent for cell phone service, were frequently invoked) with little
concern for long-term ﬁscal responsibility or, perhaps more importantly, the moral example it was setting by
rewarding the ‘lazy’ and making people believe that the job of government was to ‘give them things for free’.
Throughout our interviews, we encountered repeated avowals of the importance of walking the line and cautionary
tales of those who failed to do so, creating a ripple-eﬀect of trouble for themselves and those around them. These
concerns were ampliﬁed by the economic stress members of the American working class in general, and our
respondents speciﬁcally, were increasingly under: “Pleasant Park” had undergone a signiﬁcant decline in its base of
light manufacturing in recent decades, leading – in our respondents’ telling – to a cascade of personal and social
ills. Embracing an ethos of “walking the line” was often cited as the obvious logical and moral response to these
problems.
We believe that for many of our respondents, Republican voting is part of a larger strategy of trying to prosper
economically by learning, incorporating, and displaying the attributes that they believe lead to economic success,
including avoiding excessive spending and debt.  When good jobs are scarce, behaviors that are seen as helping in
the competition for good jobs become more salient for working class voters, and these voters are drawn to
politicians who speak about the considerable personal eﬀorts these voters are making to get and keep jobs.  This
may be a more durable feature of the working class – helping to answer the perennial question of why working class
voters do not always vote for working class parties – or it may have been strengthened by recent deindustrialization.
This explanation does not exclude the consideration of the importance of moral values as motivators of voting
behavior – indeed, we encountered a variety of voters who felt strongly and singularly about issues such as abortion
and gay rights – but it does suggest that creating a binary between economic appeals and moral/cultural values,
and arguing that the latter trump the former, is simplistic and likely substantively wrong.
This article is based on the paper, ‘Walking the Line: The White Working Class and the Economic Consequences of
Morality’, in Politics & Society.
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